The model by Di Cintio
					, 
						Marco
R&D activity and the dynamic equilibrium. Section 3 contains some concluding
remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Preferences
Consider an economy with ¹L identical households and di¤erentiated goods pro-
duced in Nm varieties, [xi ]
Nm
i=1. The representative household maximizes its
lifetime utility:
U (t0) =
Z 1
t0
e¡½(t¡t0) lnu(t)dt (1)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint that the present discounted value
of expenditure cannot be greater than the present discounted value of lifetime
labour income, plus initial wealth:Z 1
t0
R(t)Y (t)dt · A(t0) +
Z 1
t0
R(t)w(t)dt (2)
where ½ > 0 is the individual discount rate, R(t) = e¡
R t
t0
r (s)ds is the cumulative
discount factor, Y is nominal per capita expenditure, and A is initial wealth.
The typical household takes the path of wages and the interest rate as given.
Throughout the analysis, wage is the numéraire.
Preferences are identical for all consumers. We assume that there is a large
number of varieties, all of which enter symmetrically into the instantaneous
utility function u(t), which we assume to be of the Dixit-Stiglitz type3 :
u =
Ã
NmX
i=1
x¯i
! 1
¯
(3)
where xi is the consumption of each variety and 0 < ¯ < 1. As is well known,
this speci…cation has proved to be the most tractable when product di¤erenti-
ation is the main concern. The love for variety could alternatively be modelled
in a slightly di¤erent framework, by extending preferences over a continuous
product space and assuming that at any given moment in time only a subset
of potential varieties are available (Grossman and Helpman, 1989; Krugman,
1980). Over time, innovation can expand this subset, and Nm(t) is the num-
ber of varieties at time t. This utility function implies constant elasticity of
substitution between any couple of varieties:
¾ =
1
1 ¡ ¯ > 1 (4)
3 In the rest of the paper the time variable, t, is suppressed.
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The typical solution of this problem is in two stages. By Euler equation, we
…rst get the optimal dynamic expenditure path:
_Y
Y
= r ¡ ½ (5)
which also de…nes optimal saving behavior. Then, by taking the time-path of
expenditure as given, we solve the static household maximization problem at
any t; i.e. the maximization of u subject to Y =
NmP
i=1
pixi .
The h-th household demand for variety i (where i 2 [1; Nm]) is
xih (pi) =
Y
q
µ
pi
q
¶¡¾
(6)
where pi is the market price of the i-th brand, and q is the ’dual’ price index:
q =
"
NmX
i=1
p1¡¾i
# 11¡¾
(7)
Aggregating over the ¹L identical consumers, we obtain the demand schedule
faced by …rms producing the i-th brand:
xi (pi) = ¹L
Y
q
µ
pi
q
¶¡¾
(8)
Equation (8) is used in the analysis of …rms’ price-setting behaviour. Since
we shall be interested in quantity competition between …rms, we consider the
corresponding inverse demand function, along the lines suggested by Spence
(1976):
pi (xi) = ¹LY
x¯¡1i
Q¯
(9)
where pi is the market price of the i-th variety, xi is the aggregate production
of the i-th sector, and Q is the economy quantity index given by:
Q =
"
NmX
i=1
x¯i
# 1
¯
(10)
Notice the immediate interpretation of ¯ in terms of the structure of prefer-
ences. The parameter is an indicator of the degree of substitutability between
any two di¤erentiated brands: the lower is ¯ , the lower is the inter-variety inter-
dependence. As ¯ ! 0, the degree of substitution reaches the maximum level
(i.e. ¾ ! 1) of product di¤erentiation. As ¯ ! 1, there is no di¤erentiation,
the degree of substitutability becomes in…nite (i.e. ¾ ¡! 1) and any brand is
perfectly substitutable with any other. Clearly, the demand function given in
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(8) or (9) encompasses both traditional formulations of oligopoly with a homo-
geneous good and of monopolistic competition. In order to verify it, it is enough
to look at the inverse demand function under the symmetry assumption (8i;j
xi = xj = XNm and pi = pj = p). In this case, for ¯ ! 0 each sectorial demand
is de…ned independently of the others, and (8) or (9) describes a monopolis-
tic inter-sector competition; for ¯ ! 1, we obtain a set-up with homogeneous
product.
2.2 Technology
On the production side, …rms undertake two activities. First, they produce the
existing varieties, and second they can divert resources to investment in R&D
in order to create new designs. While it is generally assumed that each variety
is produced by a single …rm, in the sequel we assume that each variety can be
manufactured by N competing …rms.
This assumption can be justi…ed in di¤erent ways. First, the innovative
brand may be not patentable; because its inventor has di¢culties in applying
the patents’ law in order to prevent unauthorized use; or, furthermore, because
the product innovation is not a real invention but, simply, a combination of
existing varieties. In this latter interpretation the new product may indeed
look new to the consumers, but being not really original, is not patentable. In
other words, inventors might be unable to exclude others from making free use
of their ideas, because of di¢culties in the de…nition of property rights in the
innovation. Second, especially when international trade is allowed for, similar
varieties could indeed exhibit many overlapping characteristics (the case of the
automobile sector provides clear examples in this respect), and this creates
an environment where a (nearly) identical product is o¤ered by many …rms.
Finally, we recall that Grossman and Helpman (1991) exclude any incentive to
imitation on the basis that an intra-sector Bertrand price competition would
immediately lead pro…ts to zero, so that the copier would not be able to recoup
the positive cost of imitation. Their argument is clearly based on the idea that
…rms compete in prices. But if we imagine a di¤erent types of competition, the
scope for imitation may indeed arise. If the intra-sector competition is consistent
with a positive mark-up over marginal costs, the imitation costs can be covered
and di¤erent …rms can …nd it convenient to produce the same homogeneous
good.
Since there are Nm varieties, each of them produced by N …rms, each …rm
simultaneously faces two di¤erent competitive environments. Horizontally, at
the inter-sector level each …rm competes with other …rms producing an imperfect
substitute of its own product. Also, it competes with other …rms producing a
homogeneous product at the intra-sector level.4 Therefore, there is an inter-
sector competition (i.e. between di¤erent varieties) of the standard monopolistic
4 Notice that also in Grossman and Helpman (1991) there is a schematic discussion of
possible forms of intra-sector competition. In particular they suggest that the research labs
could be involved in quality improvements of existing varieties, so that intra-sector competition
may turn to vertical product di¤erentiation.
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type, and an intra-sector competition (within the same variety). As suggested
above, we assume that the latter is in quantities, so that the market for each
variety can be thought of as a traditional Cournot oligopoly.
The j-th …rm (j 2 [1; N ]) operating in the i-th sector, is single-product.
Each good can be produced through labour according to the linear technology:
zij (Lij) = Lij (11)
where Lij is the amount of labour employed in the i-th sector by the j-th
…rm, and zij is the …rm’s output. Hence for the j-th …rm, the cost function
is C(zij) = zij (remember that the wage, w, is the numéraire). Obviously, the
aggregate production for the i-th sector is:
xi =
0@ NX
j=1
zij
1A (12)
while the economy aggregate production is:
X =
Ã
NmX
i=1
xi
!
(13)
Therefore, the number of workers employed is:
LX =
24NmX
i=1
0@ NX
j=1
Lij
1A35 = X (14)
Each …rm chooses its production level in order to maximize pro…ts:
¼ij = pi(xi)zij ¡ zij (15)
Notice that, given the large number of existing varieties, each …rm in each sector
perceives the economy quantity index as given. In turn, this implies that the
negligibility assumption holds: each …rm perceives its own level of production,
zij , as irrelevant with respect to the aggregate production of the other sectors,
and of the economy as a whole, Q. It is the large number of available varieties
which allows for the inter-sector monopolistic competition. On the contrary, in
the intra-sector perspective each …rm takes into account the e¤ect of its own
production on the aggregate sectorial production level. This latter competition
is based upon Cournot conjectures.
Substituting (9) into (15), and using (12), we can rewrite pro…ts in terms of
individual quantity as
¼ij = ¹LY
"
NP
j=1
zij
#¯¡1
zij
Q¯
¡ zij (16)
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The …rst order condition under Cournot conjectures for any given levels of zhk ,
h 6= i and k 6= j, is
@¼ij
@zij
= 0 () ¹L Y
Q¯
264(¯ ¡ 1)
0@ NX
j=1
zij
1A¯¡2 zij +
0@ NX
j=1
zij
1A¯¡1
375 ¡ 1 = 0 (17)
Under symmetry zij = z 8 i; j, and the Nash equilibrium level of individual
output is:
z¤ = ¹LY
(¯ ¡ 1 + N )
N 2Nm
(18)
Sectorial aggregate production is, from (12):
x¤ = ¹LY
(¯ ¡ 1 + N )
NNm
. (19)
The related market price is given by (9):
p¤ =
N
¯ ¡ 1 + N . (20)
Therefore the equilibrium level of pro…ts is:
¼¤ = ¹LY
1 ¡ ¯
N 2Nm
(21)
Notice that the optimal quantity produced by any …rm is inversely pro-
portional to the number of existing varieties, Nm. The same holds for pro…ts
and sectorial aggregate production, while the price level is independent of Nm.
Notice, also, the (expected) result about the in‡uence of the degree of substi-
tutability. For a low level of ¯, inter-sector competition is less …erce because of
the low interdependence level among sectors. Table 1 synthetizes the equilibrium
outcome under these two extreme con…gurations on inter-sector competition.
Table 1 about here
At the intra-sectorial level, a simple indicator of the degree of competition is
the …rm’s sectorial market share. Pro…ts and prices are directly related with the
sectorial market power in the admitted range, s = 1N 2 ]0; 1]. In this respect,
a large number of …rms in the sector (i.e. N ¡! 1) means that no limits to
imitation exist. Free entry implies a negligible share (i.e. s ¡! 0) and the intra-
sector competition resembles perfect competition: prices equal marginal costs
and pro…ts are driven to zero. On the contrary, when a strict patent system
prevents imitation and unauthorized entry into the sector, a single …rm supplies
the entire sector (s = 1), i.e. each variety is produced by only one …rm (N = 1),
which behaves like a monopolist. This situation collapses to that described by
the Grossman and Helpman model, where the intra-sector competition is absent:
prices and pro…ts are higher, while aggregate production level is lower. Table 2
synthetizes the extreme con…guration of intra-sector competition.
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Table 2 about here
It must be stressed that the market share s can be interpreted in two di¤erent
ways. It is an index of the degree of competition of market structure, but it
can also be seen as an indicator of the degree of enforcement both of patent
law and deterrence of imitation . In this respect, the extreme values, s ! 0
and s = 1 arise under perfect competition (absence of patents) and monopoly
power (perfect patents). For intermediate values, in the range ]0; 1[, we have
some strategic interaction: the higher the value of s, the lower the degree of
competition and the higher the level of protection provided by.
Finally, we recall that if the intra-sector competition were à la Bertrand, we
would have the competitive price (because of homogeneity), independently of
the properties of the inter-sectorial competition.
2.3 Research & Development
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Lucas (1998) among others, we
assume that the production of new varieties takes place according to the inno-
vation function:
@Nm
@t
= _Nm =
1
a
LRk(t) (22)
where a is a positive parameter, LR is the number of workers employed in R&D
and k(t) is the stock of knowledge at time t. Equation (22) is the most common
formulation of R&D technology in the endogenous growth literature: it shows
a positive relation between the development of new varieties and the stock of
available knowledge at each moment in time.
Since the number of varieties changes over time, the stock of knowledge is not
constant; rather, it depends, in a proportional way, on the number of existing
varieties. This can be justi…ed in terms of learning by doing: each innovation,
by increasing the level of knowledge, makes R&D more productive.
The simplest function linking the stock of knowledge to the number of vari-
eties is the linear one:
k(t) = Nm. (23)
On the basis of the R&D technology, the cost of the creation of a new variety
is:
Iv (t) =
a
k(t)
=
a
Nm
. (24)
Making use of (23), equation (22) determines the endogenous growth rate:
g =
_Nm
Nm
= N^m =
1
a
LR . (25)
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Assuming free entry in R&D activity, the present value of pro…ts for any variety
discovered at time t must be equal to its cost of creation:
V (t0) =
Z 1
t0
R(t)¼(t)dt =
a
Nm
. (26)
At each moment in time the Fisher equation must hold: the current pro…t
plus the rate of capital gain must be equal to the value of pro…table capital
investment:
¼t + _Vt = rVt . (27)
Suppressing the time notation, and expressing (27) in proportional terms, we
have:
¼
V
+
_V
V
= r . (28)
The rate of pro…t is given by ¼V = ¹LY
(1¡¯)
aN2 , while the percentage change in the
present value of pro…ts is V^ = _VV = ¡N^m = ¡g, so that the Fisher equation
gives:
r = ¹LY
(1 ¡ ¯ )
aN 2
¡ g, (29)
which establishes, as usual, the equality between the interest rate and the divi-
dend rate, plus the capital gain rate.
By using the labour market clearing condition, the amount of available
labour is allocated between the two activities: LX for production and LR for
R&D. If the supply of labour is …xed at the level ¹L, we have:
¹L = LR + LX (30)
Equation (30) can now be rewritten, by making use of (25), together with (13),
(14) and (19); by performing these substitutions, the growth rate is expressed
by:
g =
¹L
a
µ
1 ¡ Y (¯ ¡ 1 + N )
N
¶
(31)
Since new varieties are produced through the residual workers not employed
in production, the number of varieties increases over time at the same rate g
at which production in each sector decreases. Assuming full employment, the
constraint on labour resources given by equation (31) must be always satis…ed.
The higher is the rate of innovation, the greater is the employment in R&D and
the lower the number of workers left for manufacturing.
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2.4 Dynamics
The general equilibrium is described by the equations (5), (29) and (31). By
substituting (31) into (29) for g we get
r =
¹L
a
£
Y
¡
s2(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ s(1 ¡ ¯) + 1¢ ¡ 1¤ (32)
which in turn can be substituted for r into (5), in order to obtain the following
dynamic equation in Y (where we have used the de…nition of s)
_Y = Y 2
µ ¹L
a
£
s2(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ s(1 ¡ ¯) + 1¤¶ ¡ Y µ ¹L + a½
a
¶
. (33)
This Bernoullian equation has two steady state solutions. The graph of _Y
(…gure 1) cuts the horizontal axis twice at the origin, and also at Y SS . The …rst
solution, stable, is Y = 0. The second, unstable, is
Y SS =
a½ + ¹L
¹L
1
s2(1 ¡ ¯ ) ¡ s(1 ¡ ¯ ) + 1 . (34)
The qualitative properties can be described by a phase line graph.
Figure 1 about here
For all values of Y within the interval
¤
0; Y SS
£
, expenditure must be de-
creasing, indicating that _Y < 0; this is why the arrows in this interval. For
values of Y > Y ss the opposite holds, _Y > 0 and expenditure increases
While stable, the …rst solution (Y = 0) is economically meaningless. If in
the long run the aggregate expenditure approaches zero, the rate of innovation
reaches its maximum value; in this situation the entire supply of labour is em-
ployed in R&D and there is no production activity. However in this case, the
number of products would be growing continuously at the positive rate g = ¹La ,
expenditure and pro…ts would approach to zero, but the arbitrage condition
would be violated: the present value of pro…t would be lower than the positive
entry cost. The second solution, though economically meaningful, is unstable.
Therefore we must impose stability, by assuming that starting from any initial
value Y , being a non-predetermined variable, jumps instantaneously to Y SS 5 .
In the steady state, r = ½: constant household’s expenditure must involve a
constant interest rate, equal to the sub jective discount rate.6
5 Even though it would seem questionable in Industrial Organization literature, it is com-
mon in the endogenous growth models
6 The assumption that Y jumps to its steady state equilibrium (other than Y = 0) is the
equivalent, in this set-up, of Grossman and Helpman hypothesis that nominal expenditure is
normalized and constant to one.
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We now substitute the steady state equilibrium value Y SS and r into the
Fisher equation, in order to obtain the steady state solution for the growth
rate7 :
gSS =
½a [s (1 ¡ ¯) ¡ 1] + ¹L(1 ¡ ¯)s2
s2(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ s(1 ¡ ¯) + 1
1
a
. (35)
In order to analyze the properties of the steady state solution it is useful to
see it explicitly as the simultaneous solution (for Y and g) of the labour market
clearing condition (31) and the free entry condition in R&D given by the Fisher
equation (29), the latter evaluated at r = ½8
g = ¹LY
(1 ¡ ¯ )
a
s2 ¡ ½ (36)
g =
1
a
¹L (1 + Y [s (1 ¡ ¯ ) ¡ 1]) (37)
These two linear equations are represented in …gure 2.
Figure 2 about here
Equation (36) is positively sloped in the (Y; g) plane while equation (37) is
negatively sloped since 0 < s · 1 and ¯ < 1. The intersection between the two
equations gives us the same steady state equilibrium values (34) and (35) for
Y and g. This intersection point is one where the division of labour resources,
between the two activities, production and R&D, remains constant over time.
In this respect, the rate of product development exactly matches the decline of
entry cost and the innovation would continue at a …xed rate gSS .
Now we are in a position to evaluate the relationship between the degree of
competition of market structure, captured by the market share, and the growth
rate. Considering the position of two equations, the higher s is (i.e. the lower
the degree of competition is), the greater is the (positive) slope of the …rst
equation (36), and the smaller is the (negative) slope in (37). The total e¤ect
is an higher growth rate. On the contrary, when the degree of competition is
high (i.e. the level for s is low), the resulting growth rate is lower.
7 Notice that for the admitted range of parameter s and ¯, the denominator of (35) is
positive, while for the numerator we consider values for the resource base (¹L), the productivity
in reserch lab (a) and the households’ patient (½) in order to have a meaningful (positive)
growth rate. Violating these speci…cations, economy immediately jumps a stationary state
without innovation. In this case may be that R&D will not be pro…table or productivity of
researchers is ine¢cient; the resource base are insu¢cient or households do not value wide
enough variety in consumption. (also see: Grossman and Helpman (1991); and Romer (1990)
for insu¢cient endowment of the resources needed for industrial research.)
8 Obviously, for r = ½ expenditure is constant over time; in this respect this level of the
interest rate is the sole compatible with constant expenditure.
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The interpretation of this relationship is straightforward. Suppose the lowest
level for s, i.e. s ! 0, the …rms market share is negligible and the intra-
sector market tends to be highly competitive. The equality between price and
marginal cost implies the highest production level: more workers are employed
in production, leaving few resources for R&D activity and, obviously, a lower
growth rate.
On the contrary, when the market share is maximum, no …rm has direct
competitors: setting the monopoly price, more workers are available for R&D
activities, and so, the growth rate raises. Furthermore, a lower degree of inter-
dependence among …rms leads to a higher level of pro…ts, giving more incentives
to innovation activities.
The relationship between the growth rate and market share can also be
analyzed by evaluating the derivative of gSS in (35) with respect to s:
@gSS
@s
=
[2 ¡ s(1 ¡ ¯)] [s (1 ¡ ¯)]
h
½ + ¹La
i
[s2(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ s(1 ¡ ¯) + 1]2 > 0.
Sustained innovations should be possible for s 6= 0. This means that a positive
growth rate results if, and only if, some intellectual property rights prevent the
free use of innovations.
Note that when s = 1, there is only one …rm per sector and this implies the
traditional Grossman-Helpman result:
gSSG¡H =
¹L
a
(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ ½¯. (38)
In their formulation the parameter ¯ plays a fundamental role with respect to
the product di¤erentiation degree. The lower it is, the lower is the level of
substitutability, ¾, between goods, and the higher is the pro…ts level; thus the
grows rate rises. On the other hand, when the product di¤erentiation is min-
imum (i.e. ¯ ! 1), the varieties are perfectly substitutable among themselves
and pro…ts are driven to zero. Now, there is no incentive for innovation because
zero pro…ts do not permit the recovery of the positive cost of R&D. The same
situation occurs when no patents exist (s ! 0).
3 Conclusions
The contribution of this paper can be found in its analysis of two market struc-
tures, usually considered as alternative types of competition.
In recent attempts to involve the strategic interaction in endogenous growth
models an ambiguous relationship emerges between the growth rate and the
degree of competition of market structure.
Here, denoting the degree of competition by the intra-sector market share,
the main result of the paper concerns its unambiguous e¤ect on the growth rate.
When the degree of competition is high, prices go down, the aggregate quantity
raises and the available labor force for R&D activity are reduced, so the growth
13
